1593. 48 PEOPLE Ellsworth Huntington (Concluded from page 2) supporting children. Such support might begin with a moderate sum for the expenses connected with birth, and might run through the whole period of immaturity. That is essentially what is happening in Russia. It satisfies the economic criterion method mentioned above; perhaps it is what we shall ultimately adopt in a modified form. But for our present purposes it is ruled out of court for two reasons. First, it will probably be postponed a long time because the American people is by no means ready to adopt any such socialistic system. Second, such postponement is highly desirable because this type of insurance through state aid has little if any eugenic value, and may be strongly dysgenic. In the present temper of society any such aid to children would have to apply to all classes alike. Hence its main effect would be to increase the number of children in the same types of families where children are now too numerous. Before state aid of any kind is invoked by parents it is highly desirable that the eugenic knowledge of the country should have advanced so far that the majority will be in favor of giving more help to what appear to be the more valuable types of people than to those who are obviously incompetent or weak. Voluntary insurance meets our criterion as to selection, but fails economically. The policy holders would tend to be a highly selected group of people who are both thoughtful and thrifty. Such people would see the advantages of spreading the expenditures for their children uniformly over a fairly long period instead of meeting these expenditures in large payments at irregular intervals. If, however, such a form of insurance paid merely the expense of childbirth, nobody would take out policies except young married people who hoped in due time to have children. If it paid educational expenses the same kind of people would take out policies, but would carry them longer. In either case, as soon as their families were complete or had finished their education, the policy holders would stop paying. They might even reduce the intervals between the birth of children, or push the children ahead too rapidly in their education in order to shorten the period during which premiums would be paid. In any event the premiums would have to be very large in proportion to the total insurance, for most of the policy holders would receive frequent payments. Thus unless the insurance companies indulged in extensive philanthropy, the net effect would merely be to supplant the savings banks by insurance companies which would pay their policy holders only under certain specific conditions relating to children. The policy holders would be freed from the strain of meeting large bills at any one time, but they would have to pay as much or more than now for the privilege of having children. Their economic level would be depressed almost as much as now. Thus this form of insurance fails sadly at meeting our second criterion. Moreover, the families which adopted it would be just the ones which now save up money for the sake of having children. Therefore, it is hard to see how this method would have any appreciable effect upon the number of children in the type of families which we desire to see increase. It is also suggested that the evils of the present differential birth rate might be lessened by a change in our laws as to inheritance taxes. At present the tax in many states is less when property goes to wife, husband, or children than when it goes to others, and less when it goes to near relatives than when it goes to strangers. It is now proposed to modify such laws so that the tax will be still further reduced if the property goes to families with a large number of children. Such a scheme fails to satisfy either of our criteria. It exerts a selective action, to be sure, but the selection is haphazard and of little eugenic value. Families which happened to have wealth are indeed benefited, but so are those where grandparents and unmarried uncles and aunts happen to die young. Moreover, death is notoriously uncertain and fortunes wax and wane. Hence only the ignorant and shiftless are likely to increase the number of their children in the hope that some relative will die and thus make it easy to pay the children's expenses. On the economic side the case appears to be still worse. Parents need financial help when their children are born and not when some relative happens to die. They also need to know beforehand just what to expect. Thus they can plan their families wisely. Plans based on the expectation of an inheritance at some particular date are usually far from wise. Moreover, the time when an inheritance is received is exactly the time when a family with children least needs whatever minor help might come from a lower tax rate. At such times the economic level rises. A slightly greater rise can scarcely have much effect upon the number of children, even if it happens to come during the period of childbearing. All this does not mean that it might not be worth while to have a law such as we are discussing. It merely means that such a law could scarcely be expected to have much effect eugenically. Foundation Needed In order that any economic scheme may have a real and important effect in raising the eugenic level it seems essential that it should satisfy the following requirements: First, it must exercise a sound selective effect as described under our first criterion. Second, it must be absolutely dependable as to its time of application, its amount, and its duration. Only thus can wise parents make wise plans. Third, it must remove the strain which now comes by reason of the heavy expenses connected with childbirth. Fourth, it must provide a future increment of income so that the family may live as comfortably after the children have come as before. For the present the ideal method of attaining this result would seem to be through some great foundation, adequately endowed. Such a foundation would carefully pick young married couples of the right quality. Then it would virtually pay the mother for enduring the pain of childbirth and devoting her life to the brining up of healthy, happy, hearty children who will be real contributors to human progress. Such a foundation will surely be established some day. It may do even more good than our endowed hospitals, libraries, museums, universities, and institutions for research. It will indeed be a research institution engaged in the most profound and far-reaching kind of investigation and experiment. [centered hairline score] Ray Erwin Baber (Concluded from page 3) to believe they would appeal more strongly to the less intelligent than to the more intelligent. Witness the increase in illegitimacy[sic] in England following the act which gave a small sum to each mother of an illegitimate child. The law defeated its own purpose and had to be repealed. I do not see how any of our present tax measures or bonuses can claim to be definitely eugenic until they become truly selective on the bases of mental ability and physical fitness. Intelligent selection might involve showing public approval and giving large rewards to families of good stock (whether rich or poor), but showing disapproval of numerous births and if necessary enforcing a limitation of offspring, in families of bad stock (whether rich or poor). To those who promptly brand such a birth quota as "undemocratic" and "unthinkable", I would merely point out one well established but oft forgotten fact to show that such a measure is not impossible even though not imminent - the fact that in the group "the first task of life is to live." When the need arises the group imposes on the individual any hardship necessary to [italics]group[end italics] survival. Measures once as "unthinkable" as the above (and history is full of them) are today accepted with hardly a dissenting voice. Society ultimately interferes with the "sacred rights" of the individual to any degree essential to its own protection. It remains to be seen whether a universal knowledge of contraception will correct the present dysgenic differential birth rate. If it does not, it would seem that society cannot much longer refrain from using its intelligence. [centered hairline score] Maurice R. Davie (Concluded from page 3) such financial assistance, at best, would merely touch one of the many factors influencing the birth rate. The provisions of the income tax, giving higher "personal exemption" to the married and allowing "credit" for each dependent child, are based on the sound principle of equalizing taxable ability. So are progressive tax rates. There is no practicable scientific program by which this device could be applied eugenically, and if there were, it is still a question of whether it would affect the birth rate of the superior. [centered hairline score] Eugene Robison (Concluded from page 2) and conversely, that state wants to protect itself from offering baby bounties to morons. It seems to me this would ensure desirable citizens in future generations and is about the only place that insurance enters this discussion. [end]